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Assessing Three Theories of Information Systems Innovation: An
Interpretive Case Study of a Funds Management Company
Nicholas David Jones
University of Auckland
Michael D. Myers
University of Auckland
Abstract
There is a growing body of research looking at the adoption and diffusion of IS innovations.
This paper assesses three theories of IS innovation and adoption: the stages model, the
decision episode framework, and the technological framework model. The three theories are
assessed with reference to an in-depth interpretive case study of a funds management
company in New Zealand. The most important finding is that no one theory on its own is able
to explain what happened in this particular case. All three theories of IS innovation are useful
in highlighting particular areas of interest, and contribute to our understanding of the entire IS
adoption process.
Keywords: innovation, adoption, diffusion, interpretive research, case study, New Zealand
1. Introduction
Much recent research has focused on the adoption and diffusion of IS innovations. An
innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new, while diffusion of
innovation is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels,
over time, among the members of a social system (Rogers, 1983). Applying this to
information systems, the focus is on the successful adoption and use of information
technology in organizations. As Baskerville and Pries-Heje (Baskerville and Pries-Heje,
2001) point out, not only must those who originally develop the technology be innovative,
but those who adopt IT must also be innovative in applying the IT in their own work lives.
The “innovation must diffuse along with the IT.”
Many theories of the adoption and diffusion of IS innovations have been suggested in the IS
research literature. This paper discusses three of the most commonly used theories: the stages
model, the decision episode framework, and the technological framework model. The
primary purpose of this paper is to assess these three theories with reference to an in-depth
interpretive case study of a funds management company in New Zealand. The case highlights
the strengths and weaknesses of each theory and also provides some rich insights into the
inhibitors of innovation. Our analysis shows that no one theory on its own is able to explain
what happened in this particular case. This paper can be seen as a call for a broader
perspective to be taken on the adoption and diffusion of IS innovations.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section (Section 2), the three theoretical
frameworks are described. This is followed by a brief discussion of the research method (in
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Section 3). In Section 4 the case study data are presented. Section 5 analyses the case study
data. The final section is the discussion and conclusions.
2. Three Theoretical Frameworks
Many different theoretical frameworks and approaches with regard IS adoption and
innovation have been suggested in the IS research literature (e.g. Allen, 1999; Attewell,
1992; Baskerville and Pries-Heje, 2001; Grover, 1997; Kautz and Pries-Heje, 1996;
Swanson, 1994; Zmud, 1984). In this paper we will compare and contrast three widely
used theories of IS innovation: the stages model, the decision episode framework, and
the technological framework model. These three models will now be described.
2.1 Stages model
Rogers’ (1983) early innovation diffusion framework consisted of five linear phases
(knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and institutionalising). The framework
acknowledges that before deciding to adopt an innovation, potential adopters are involved in
a process of persuasion. Boundary spanners (i.e. people who act across group or
organisational boundaries) expose the organisation to information about the innovation that
influences the decision. Implementation involves acceptance and integration of the
innovation into the organisation’s systems, processes, and routines. A member of the core
group (administrative or technical) that it affects should oversee the implementation. The
institutionalising phase is where the innovation is adapted to fit within an organisation.
The main weakness of Rogers’ model is that it shows the diffusion process as linear and as
being driven by the needs of potential adopters. This fails to address the complex nature of
the relationship between the adopter and the supplier e.g. how suppliers can “push”
technological innovations on to adopters. Later studies of diffusion have recognised a more
complex supplier/adopter relationship.
Zmud (1982) found organizational support for liaison groups to be a key ingredient in
facilitating implementations. The existence of a formal internal technical service group
comprised of technology champions and specialists enhances the transfer of technical knowhow (Nilakanta and Scamell, 1990), and shows a proactive technological orientation. As well
as knowledge flowing from the outside into the implementing organisation (diffusion),
knowledge also flows from the internal implementing group to the outside supplier, termed
‘innofusion’ (Robertson, et al., 1996). This enables the supplier to learn by retaining
situation specific knowledge and technology from the implementation process, and further
diffuse the innovation. Rogers (1983) argues that diffusion is more realistically understood
this way rather than as information transfer in bulk to the adopter/implementer.
2.2 Decision Episode Framework
Robertson et al. (1996) focus on a network of interrelationships. Called the Decision Episode
Framework (DEF), their theory looks at the needs and activities of the different groups
involved - from the supply side, to the innovation pool, and the users (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The Decision Episode Framework (adapted from Robertson et al (1996, p. 356)
The supply side shapes the availability of technology to the users. The innovation pool is the
sum of technology used to provide an answer to the user’s problem. The end result is the
commodification of knowledge and its selective transfer between the participants and groups
comprising a network.
Robertson et al. (1996) define networks as the basic social form that permits interorganisational interactions of exchange (including exchange of knowledge). Boundary
spanning behaviours (across group and organisational boundaries) will depend on the societal
and institutional context within which the organisations are embedded. The composition of
the groups involved in the network may bias decisions toward a particular group’s self
interest. Employees actively involved in these networks are more likely to make informed
decisions.
The DEF framework shows the users as active decision makers in a series of ‘decision
episodes.’ Unlike the linear stages model discussed earlier, the DEF episodes are not seen as
discrete or "unilinear" stages, but "interactive and subject to loopbacks and modifications"
(Clark, et al., 1992, p.73). This is an iterative process of problem definition and solution
generation where the user’s image of the technology is constantly changing. The DEF
recognises the importance of political influence on the innovation process, and
accommodates changes in problem ownership as the innovation process unfolds (Robertson,
et al., 1996).
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Studies have shown that the existence of a formal internal technical service group in the
adopting organisation enhances the transfer of technical know-how. Attewell (1992) finds
that firms delay adoption of complex technology until they know they have the technical
know-how to implement and operate it successfully. The implication is that as knowledge
barriers are lowered, diffusion speeds up.
2.3 Technological Frameworks’ Model
Leon (1996) looks at knowledge related aspects of diffusion of software technologies. Leon
discusses what he calls ‘Technological Frameworks’, which are maps of individuals’ and
groups’ different reference frameworks. These frameworks include many social and
contextual factors, such as the degree to which the group is working cooperatively with the
technology provider to adapt the technology to the requirements of their company.
In using these technological frameworks, Leon illustrates how individuals and groups that
have different reference frameworks have different perceptions of the technology (see Figure
2). When dealing with communities which have different reference frameworks there needs
to be effort put into aligning their views so that a mutually beneficial understanding of the
technology can be reached.
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adoption

USER'S GROUP
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adoption

perceived tech. #2
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technology
world

provider's perceived technology
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Group of technology providers

Figure 2 User groups differing technological frameworks (Leon, p.99)
Project team communication with both internal and external sources of innovation
implementation is important. Effective communication requires varied information sources
and quality channels of communication. The time required to diffuse a technology is strongly
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dependent on the mechanisms used by stakeholders to communicate information, and
increases when frameworks are not aligned.
Leon decomposes possible groups into circles of diffusion (see Figure 3). At each level there
are different technological frames e.g. those used by project managers, developers, or
implementers. The involvement of various groups changes over time, depending on the skills
and knowledge required.
Mixed transition group to reduce
inconsistencies in technological frames
Interfaces

Involvement time
Customers
External
technical staff
Transition
group
Top
management

Figure 3 Circles of Diffusion (adapted from Leon, p.107)
Looking at the interface between these groups it is possible to understand the difficulty in
“traversing” the interface. These interfaces can be external or internal to a given circle. It is
this inconsistency of technological frameworks that is partly to blame for reported problems
of introducing a predetermined technology into a certain context. Leon postulates that a
failure to understand different technology frameworks is one of the most important causes of
failures in adopting technological innovations.
2.4 Summary
We can see that, while the three models overlap in some areas, the perspective they take on
the innovation process is quite different. The stages model sees the diffusion process as linear
and as being driven by the needs of potential adopters. The DEF model focuses on numerous
decision episodes within a network of interrelationships. The Technological Frameworks
model focuses on the perceptions of various groups, and the alignment of their technological
frameworks.
3. Research Method
As was stated earlier, one of the main purposes of this research was to assess three theories of
IS innovation and adoption. We wanted to study one organisation in depth, focusing on the
process, context and outcome of IT adoption. It was determined that the most appropriate
research method for doing this was the interpretive case study. (Klein and Myers, 1999;
Myers, 1997; Walsham, 1993; Walsham, 1995a; Walsham, 1995b).
The focus of our analysis was one specific case of IT adoption, where we wanted to
understand the context, process and outcome of one particular project. The data were used to
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construct an historical narrative of an IT project in a financial services company in New
Zealand, from inception to final implementation.
Data were obtained from formal interviews, numerous documentary sources, and many
informal discussions with some of the participants. The company in question
(InvestmentLink) provided access to all their current employees for interviews. These
employees had worked for InvestmentLink for at least two years, and several had been with
the company from its inception. Interviews were held with two of the initial board members
who had been strong advocates of the system and whose organisations were early adopters.
Interviews were also held with employees of InvestmentLink’s technology partner. The
interviews typically lasted sixty minutes.
Published documents included newspaper articles, industry newsletters, magazines and
reports, journal and newspaper articles, books, electronic media such as web sites, and
various company supplied documents such as minutes of meetings, business plans, and copies
of emails. The research was conducted by one of the authors over a four month period, from
June 1999 to September 1999.
The principles of interpretive research suggested by Klein and Myers were used to guide the
conduct of the research (Klein and Myers, 1999). Briefly, the discovery of the multiple
perspectives of staff from diverse backgrounds (marketing, finance, management, technical)
led to issues and findings being revised and reinterpreted as the project progressed The
hermeneutic circle was used as the mode of analysis, attempting to make sense of conflicting
interpretations by critically examining them with reference to their context.
4. Case Study: InvestmentLink New Zealand
This case study concerns the diffusion of a technological innovation, the InvestmentLink
information system, and its take-up by financial advisors and fund managers. The
InvestmentLink system had its origins in Australia and is owned by InvestmentLink Pty
Limited in Australia (ILA). InvestmentLink New Zealand (ILNZ) is a private company
owned by InvestmentLink Pty Limited and fund managers from the New Zealand market
through the InvestmentLink Steering Committee(ILSC). InvestmentLink New Zealand was
set up as marketing company, and holds the license for the New Zealand market for the
system.
4.1 Investment & Financial Services Sector
In the managed funds industry, there are two main parties, Fund Managers (FM), who
provide investment products, and Financial Advisers (FA), who collect market information
and advise clients on their best investment options.
Previously, if a client asked a FA for a report on the status of his or her investment portfolio,
a complex manual process ensued, requiring many phone calls requesting and chasing-up
information. The process was also expensive and time consuming for the FMs, as they had to
service the FAs’ requests for basic information. The process was prone to errors as there
were many stages at which data would need to be re-entered into disparate information
systems by the FA or the FM. Reporting a client’s position was thus time consuming and
unreliable, which undermined the effectiveness of the FAs in giving investment advice. The
concept of InvestmentLink was born out of a need to re-engineer this process.
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The idea for a new system was also spurred on by a depressed market. Costs savings were
becoming increasingly important, particularly with other competing investment products
being developed. InvestmentLink was seen as very important to the financial planning and
funds management industry because it would
“provide significant cost savings which may be the salvation of financial advisers
battling to keep clients in the face of an upsurge of direct marketed products from life
insurance and superannuation companies” (The National Business Review, 18 October
1996, p.14).
4.2 The InvestmentLink System
The InvestmentLink system is an industry-wide service that provides the financial services
sector with secure access to a centralised, consolidated-by-client source of managed-fund
data. The source of data is the FM, who downloads data daily to the central InvestmentLink
database. This data details the current value and composition of a client’s investment
portfolio, which is consolidated with the rest of the client’s investment data in
InvestmentLink. The data stored in the InvestmentLink database is then available for
download by the FAs. The FA uses a desktop client, or Portfolio Management System
(PMS), to manage their client’s portfolio. The critical functionality of InvestmentLink is that
it aggregates a client’s investment portfolio under a unique client number, called an
InvestmentLink Client Number (ILCN). The InvestmentLink system is shown in Figure 4.
Fund
Manager

Fund
Manager

Fund
Manager

Client A
ILCN

Client A
ILCN

Client A
ILCN

InvestmentLink

Financial
Advisor

Client A
ILCN

Figure 4. The InvestmentLink system
The take up process, or diffusion of the innovation (the InvestmentLink system), refers to the
bringing of FMs and FAs onto InvestmentLink. When a FM or FA joins InvestmentLink,
they sign an agreement and pay an initial licensing fee. Once a FM or FA becomes active,
there are monthly fees and download charges.
4.3 Organisations and People
The InvestmentLink Steering Committee (ILSC) was established on 22 October 1996. The
members of ILSC were executives from funds management companies in New Zealand.
Since almost all of these funds management companies were subsidiaries of Australian
companies, no market search for a suitable software product for the New Zealand market was
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carried out. As the Australian parent companies were already using InvestmentLink, it was
assumed that this product would be suitable for New Zealand. ILA (the owner and supplier of
the system) was a similar beast to ILNZ; it was owned by a combination of representatives
from the funds management industry and a technology provider.
In New Zealand both the ILSC and ILNZ boards were overseeing the project. The chairman
of the ILSC board was also chairman of the ILNZ board, and occupied an executive role
within ILNZ. His focus was seen to be at the level of servicing the existing customer base, of
which his fulltime employer was one.
In Australia, CPS Systems (CPS) was ILA’s technology partner. As CPS had a partly owned
New Zealand subsidiary called CPSNZ, CPS was chosen to support the development of the
system for ILNZ. Like its Australian counterpart, CPSNZ was perceived to have the required
development skills and had done prior development work with internet based interorganisational information systems.
After a proactive start supporting ILNZ, however, CPSNZ withdrew. They realised they
would be making a large investment with limited potential for income. They originally
thought they would get secondary business through being a reseller of InvestmentLink, but
then realised that this would not be the case.
ILNZ’s chairman took a marketing focus in his initiatives without realising there were serious
implementation problems due to the lack of IT support. This support was meant to be
forthcoming from ILA and its partner, and involved customisation (as agreed between the
partners), and support of the uptake process. But with the skills of the board members and
other employees of the organisation being strongly focused around the funds management
industry, and the internally held conviction that ILNZ was a sales and marketing company,
there was scant regard given to the role that technology was to play in the implementation
process.
4.4 Markets and Structures
There were further complications in transferring the system from Australia to New Zealand.
The differing regulatory environments shapes their market structures. In Australia strict
reporting requirements meant that FAs formed large advisor groups, whereas in New Zealand
the absence of such regulations meant that FAs tended to operate singly.
This had an impact on the ease with which the system was implemented. While the costs of
implementing InvestmentLink in Australia (ILA) were minimised by FAs being able to
amortise it across the entire group, in New Zealand each single FA had to face this cost
burden alone. This was seen as a significant factor for the smaller FAs, who tended not to
have a shared or internal IS function, and so needed to bring in consultants to carry out this
work. This was made worse by the fact that their internal systems were unique, whereas in
Australia, FAs within a group already used a shared IS.
There were several attempts to focus on the problems with the take-up process in New
Zealand. CPSNZ rejected suggestions of possible development initiatives, as they were not
looking to provide technology development within New Zealand. There was a fundamental
misalignment between CPSNZ’s intentions and the needs of ILNZ. CPSNZ was looking for
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a product that it could resell; ILNZ was looking for a technology partner for development and
support in New Zealand.
4.5 Knowledge
One of the main problems that emerged was the lack of IT knowledge within the New
Zealand operation. Given ILNZ’s focus as a marketing and sales organisation, staff with sales
and marketing experience were appointed to positions within the company, but none of these
people had any IT skills.
The board seemed unable to realise the problematic nature of the technology. Although ILSC
had an articulated goal of stimulating technological innovation, ILNZ did little strategically
to affect this goal. It appears they expected the IT strategy to be executed by ILA.
Initially, ILNZ focused on getting many sales for the new system, Operationally, however,
ILNZ had difficulty assisting their clients when they encountered implementation problems.
The lack of IT knowledge accentuated another problem. After the first FMs became active,
the others trying to come on were mostly small FMs who had no in-house IT and a smaller
revenue base with which to absorb the development costs. Without the help of ILNZ, each
company had to rely on an outside consultancy to interpret the file specification and attempt
to implement it. Due to the diverse interests involved, ILNZ found that many of the FMs had
misguided interpretations of the specification. This was only uncovered during testing, or
even worse, once the FM had started downloading.
This cascaded down to the FMs who had trouble becoming compliant. They started backing
off due to sunk costs, delays, and growing awareness that many others were having similar
problems. InvestmentLink was only going to provide value if it had a large degree of take up
in the market. But more and more FMs failed to meet their implementation deadlines.
4.6 Technology and Roles
One of the problems that emerged was the perception of the technology by the various
stakeholders. This started with the original agreement between ILA and ILNZ. ILNZ
understood that the technology was being implemented successfully in the Australian market,
and so expected it to run smoothly in New Zealand. In reality the take-up process was
complex, often involving multiple legacy systems and staff who did not understand the
system.
With no internal IT competence, there was little ILNZ could do to provide effective
assistance. Barriers to communication operated at two levels, between ILNZ and their clients,
and between ILA and ILNZ. One was related to the mindset and strategic focus of the
company as discussed earlier, the other was a contractual and cost issue.
The initial agreement between ILNZ and ILA stipulated that ILA would provide technical
assistance to aid the take-up of InvestmentLink by ILNZ, along with training to ILNZ staff.
Unfortunately, ILA had stretched their resources in solving their own problems. Added to
this, ILNZ pays a fixed annual fee to ILA for provision of the InvestmentLink service. The
costs to ILNZ are not based on system usage, so there is little incentive for ILA to ensure
ILNZ receive the support they require.
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Over time, the initial ownership structure, the differences in markets, and the attributes of the
technology all became inhibitors to the success of InvestmentLink in New Zealand. There
was still a level of determination within the organisation that InvestmentLink was going to
succeed. However, at the time of the empirical research (1999), the financial data showed
that there had been no significant growth in the number of clients using the system since mid1997. Also, many adopting companies had not become ‘active’ three years or more after their
strategic decision to ‘join’ InvestmentLink, as shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Fund Managers joined and active on InvestmentLink in New Zealand
5. Case Analysis
In Section 2 above, three models of diffusion of innovation were presented: the stages model,
the Decision Episode Framework (DEF), and the technological framework model. In this
section the aspects of the case that are highlighted by each of the three models are
summarised, along with a brief description of how they fit with the case data.
5.1 The Stages Model
The stages model looks at adoption and diffusion of innovation mostly from a perspective
internal to the adopting organisation. This study's focus, however, was from the perspective
of an industry collaborative that acts as an agent for the technology supplier (but is not the
implementing adopter per se). The issues that were in the adopter were also in the supplier;
therefore the stages model takes too narrow a focus.
Table 1 summarises the case in relation to the stages model.

1014

Stages model
The InvestmentLink Case Study
Adoption is the decision process and final After initial acceptance many clients revisited the
mandate to adopt an innovation.
adoption decision due to resource constraints, turnover
of staff, and reassessment of priorities.
An internal need or a market push initiates the Members of the funds management industry identified
innovation. This leads to a proposal being put the need for a back office automation system. It was at
forward for acceptance at the adoption stage.
an aggregate level that the proposal was put forward.
The implementation of an innovation should The innovation was seen as a technical innovation, but
be overseen by a member of the core that it the implementation was overseen by administrative
affects.
personnel.
At the implementation stage, organisations There was neither an internal technical services group,
need technical resources and an internal nor any technical resources internal to the smaller
technical services group for support.
New Zealand clients.
Technology champion and technology There were no technology specialists in the smaller
specialist, who have slack resources for clients adopting in New Zealand, with the larger
investigating new technologies.
companies relying on their Australian parents for
knowledge and support.
A proactive technological orientation.
FMs and FAs made board level decisions to adopt
InvestmentLink without any desire to investigate the
technology per se.
Knowledge flowing both ways.
As adopters implemented on their own (using external
consultants) there was no channel for the retention of
site specific knowledge.

Table 1. Stages Model for ILNZ
5.2 The Decision Episode Framework
Robertson et al's (1996) Decision Episode Framework (DEF) depicts innovation as involving
three parties (adopting organisation, supplier network, and innovation pool), and focuses
primarily on the impact of various interactions with the adopting organisation. Table 2
summarises the case in relation to the DEF framework.
At the organisational level many companies had ‘adopted’ the innovation through purchasing
shares in the industry organisation and paying their license and monthly fees. Some of these
companies made this move only to regress later, usually following a change in ownership,
markets, or personnel. A change in ownership caused companies to reassess their position
regarding the innovation, before deciding whether to continue with it. This ties in with the
core of the DEF model of iterative decision episodes and changing decision ownership.
In this research project we found that there were many ‘levels’ to a decision to adopt (the
industry level, organisational level, and individual level). The industry cooperative body
ILNZ facilitated the industry level decision, which was an unusual situation of a competitive
decision being made in collaboration, and outside the adopting organisation. There were also
other decisions made in the supplier network, which the model would attribute to the adopter.
This highlights the problematic nature of a narrow focus on the adopter as the locus of
decision-making.
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DEF model
Supplier network acknowledged to have an
interest in promoting the diffusion of specific
technologies.
Boundary spanning behaviours that occur will
depend on the societal and institutional context
within which the organisations are embedded
The composition of the groups involved in the
network may weight their decision toward a
particular groups self interest
Employees involved in networks are more likely
to make informed decisions.
Users as iterative decision makers (interactive,
and subject to loopbacks and modifications)

Existence of a formal internal technical service
group in the adopting organisation enhances the
transfer of technical know-how
Attewell finds that firms delay adoption of
complex technology until they know they have
the technical know-how to implement and
operate it successfully.

The InvestmentLink Case Study
ILNZ marketed a technology developed in the
Australian market, which was different from its own.
It did this as part of the supplier network.
While there were planned boundary-spanning
activities between the Australian and New Zealand
partners, resource constraints and misaligned
corporate strategies meant these did not eventuate.
Those involved in the decision making process held
an economic interest in New Zealand
The only networks employees were involved in were
related to the funds management industry, its
products and markets.
The adopting organisations iterated between
adopting and implementing, even after the initial
adoption decision. This was often due to changes in
management.
There was no internal technical service group in the
adopting organisations able to participate in
knowledge transfer.
There were many delays for adopting organisations,
although this wasn’t deliberate but a side effect of
their lack of technical know-how.

Table 2. DEF model for ILNZ
5.3 Technological Frameworks
The Technological Frameworks model depicts innovation in terms of the historical
preconceptions of many different stakeholders in an organisation. Its fundamental tenet is
that aligning views through open communication leads to successful innovation. Table 3
summarises the case in relation to the DEF framework.
The analysis using this model shows that the perceptions of technology internal to the
adopting organisation were not informed in many vital areas. While a technical services
group with the necessary knowledge did exist, they were located in the supplier, and the
channels of communication that existed were of very low quality.
The Technological Frameworks model accommodates the differing perceptions of groups,
but fails to illustrate the barriers to communication clearly. From earlier analysis using the
DEF we saw that political, geographic, and market influences affected communication and
knowledge transfer. By not acknowledging the role these boundaries have in impeding
communication this model loses the ability to explain some of the unique aspects of this case.

1016

Technological frameworks
Different reference frameworks
different perceived technologies

leads

to

Effort needs to be put in to aligning different
reference views so that a mutually beneficial
understanding of the technology can be reached
Project team communication with both internal
and
external
sources
of
innovation
implementation is important.
Various information sources and channels of
communication
affect
effective
communication.
Quality rather than quantity of channels
determine the effectiveness of communication.
Effective communication aids in aligning
frameworks.
Time required to diffuse a technology is
strongly dependent on the mechanisms used by
stakeholders to perform work and to
communicate
information
with
other
stakeholders through defined interfaces.
Harder when frameworks aren't aligned.
Groups and group members participation
change during the life of the project, depending
on needs for skills and knowledge

The InvestmentLink Case Study
There were at least three different perceptions of
the technology (ILA, ILNZ, and FMs and FAs in
New Zealand)
There is no evidence of an effort to align reference
views. No focus was given to the technology
There was little concept of a project team, with
little ongoing communication with or between
adopters.
There was only one focus for support requests from
the sales staff, the Australian helpdesk. Very low
levels of service were experienced.
There were very few channels available and the
ones used were of low quality. The New Zealand
sales staff found it frustrating and demoralising to
constantly receive no reply from requests to the
Australian helpdesk.
With no effort to align frameworks and poor
communication channels, the time required would
be expected to increase, which is inline with the
observed performance. Clients who expected to
become ‘active’ in several months were taking
several years.
Although hired for their experience in the financial
sector, front-line sales staff provided technical
support, as the team had no technical specialists.

Table 3. Technological Frameworks model for ILNZ
6. Discussion and Conclusions
In the space available we have been able to give only a brief overview of the ILNZ case.
Even so we have been able to show something of the richness of the story as it unfolded
showing the many dimensions of diffusion of innovation in this context. We have seen
something of the complexity of interactions between people, organisations, markets, legal
structures, and knowledge. We have also seen that while all three models of IT adoption and
innovation are valuable, no one theory on its own is able to explain what happened in this
particular case. All three theories of IS innovation are useful in highlighting particular areas
of interest, and contribute to our understanding of the entire IS adoption process. But some
aspects of the case are also not captured very well by any of the three models.
For example, all three innovation models mention the importance of an internal technical
group within the adopting organisation. This group is supposed to influence the
understanding of the technological innovation and the decision making process and makes
available relevant knowledge to assist in the implementation of the innovation. The literature
discusses the location of this technical services group as inside the adopting organisation,
whereas in the case it existed deep within the supplier network. Not only did this impede
access, but it also meant that this group was removed from the implementation process,
removing the ability for members of the group to learn from situation specific problems.
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The distance between the technology partners (geographically, and also in terms of strategic
alignment) accentuated communication problems, despite contractual agreement to support
ILNZ clients. ILNZ support staff were unable to access the information from ILA, who in
turn were not prepared to pay for the technical support required from their technology partner.
In this case there was also a lack of understanding of strategic importance of IT. This led to a
series of breakdowns in communication and to problems of knowledge retention.
We can conclude that all three models are useful in highlighting particular areas of interest.
The three models of innovation provide different insights due to the perspectives they take
(c.f. Baskerville and Pries-Heje, 2001). However each model captures just one part of the
story. We hope that future researchers will gain further insights by taking a broader
perspective on the entire adoption and diffusion of innovation process.
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